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PRIVACY, FAMILY AUTONOMY, AND
THE MALTREATED CHILD
JUDITH G. MCMULLEN*
INTRODUCTION
This article examines the concepts of family autonomy and family pri-
vacy as they have developed in American law. Attempts to accommodate
family autonomy and privacy interests have significantly compromised the
protection of our children, and this article will demonstrate that privacy
interests have traditionally served as justifications for leaving many mal-
treated children unprotected. Two fundamental assumptions provide the
basis for the importance of family autonomy and privacy: (1) that privacy
strengthens families, and (2) that parents will act in the best interests of
their children. However, this article will illustrate that these assumptions
are not true in many instances, and are especially suspect in the case of
families where children are maltreated. This article concludes that we
should not sacrifice the healthy development of a significant number of chil-
dren to achieve a society that respects the privacy of individuals and the
autonomy of families. Rather, we should acknowledge that there may be
approaches, such as mandatory educational programs or community-based
support centers, that respect individual privacy and preserve family auton-
omy while meeting the needs of children.
I. FAMILY AUTONOMY IN AMERICAN LAW
A. Definitional Issues
It must be acknowledged that it is difficult to define many of the terms
used in this article. The terms "privacy" and "family autonomy" are noto-
riously ill-defined and have different meanings in different contexts. Nor do
the terms "family" and "child maltreatment" have agreed-upon definitions.
However, for purposes of this article, broad definitions of the terms will be
used.1 For the purposes of this discussion, the definition of "privacy" of-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. B.A., University of Notre
Dame; J.D., Yale University. The author also serves as a parents' group facilitator for Parents
Anonymous, a self-help organization for parents under stress. She wishes to thank all of the
members of that organization, and particularly the parents in her group, for the many insights
they have provided. She also wishes to thank Steven M. Barkan for his comments on an earlier
draft of this article.
1. "'Family' will be used to mean a discrete group within the horde." MARY ANN GLEN-
DON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 3 (1981). "Child maltreatment" will be used
MARQUEYTE LAW REVIEW
fered by Julie C. Inmes,2 a philosopher and author of Privacy, Intimacy, and
Isolation, shall be used: "[P]rivacy is the state of an individual... having
control over a realm of intimacy, which contains her decisions about inti-
mate access to herself (including intimate informational access) and her de-
cisions about her own intimate actions. ' ' 3  The expression "family
autonomy," however, will refer to a situation where the family itself con-
trols access to itself and the decisions of its members.
Additionally, "family autonomy" will refer to the assumption that a
family unit, however defined, should be governed by the private decisions of
some or all of its members. The decisions will not be subject to scrutiny or
interference from outside authorities unless there is a compelling reason
which is itself discernible without intrusion. Thus, family autonomy will be
considered a derivative of individual privacy because a family is a group of
individuals, each possessing the right of privacy. These privacy rights are
meaningless unless a specific context exists where those rights are properly
exercised. The family is that context. In other words, family autonomy is
the state of separateness from societal intervention that occurs when adult
family members are allowed to freely exercise their own rights of privacy in
family decision-making.
Most judicial opinions dealing with privacy concern issues such as sex-
ual relations and procreation. However, family autonomy arises in a
number of other contexts, such as parental decisions regarding education
and medical care for children. Arguments favoring family autonomy may
be justified by theories that claim that parents have a right to the care and
custody of their children;4 that children have a right to be left alone in an
intact family;5 or that strong, private families must be protected because of
their value to society.6 Some scholars claim that cases that deal with an
individual's right to privacy are limited to individuals within the context of
traditional marriages and families, and thus might more properly be under-
stood as expansions of the doctrine of family autonomy.7 Considerable
to mean acts of omission or commission by a parent or other person which are inappropriate or
damaging to the child's physical or emotional well-being. See generally, JAMES GARBARINO &
GWEN GILLIAM, UNDERSTANDING ABUSIVE FAMILIES (1980).
2. JULIE C. INNES, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION (1992).
3. Id. at 56.
4. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S 158, 166 (1944).
5. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979).
6. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-32 (1972) (Amish family's decision not to
send children to high school was protected based on the interests of the Amish community).
7. For an explanation as well as a critique of this view, see June Aline Eichbaum, Towards an
Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361 (1979).
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overlap exists between the vagaries of privacy and family autonomy as the
terms are used in law.
One of the problems in establishing reasonable limits on individual pri-
vacy or family autonomy is that the terms are not used consistently. Legal
and philosophical accounts of privacy differ as to whether the essence is the
individual's accessibility to outside scrutiny or interference, or the individ-
ual's control over intimate matters concerning herself.' There is also a lack
of agreement as to why privacy is a valued right at all.9 It is sometimes
claimed that privacy has some intrinsic value because it leads to desirable
consequences,1 0 but value has also been attributed to privacy because it em-
bodies respect for inviolate individuals.
In the context of parent-child relations, we could characterize family
autonomy as respect for the control parents have over intimate decisions,
such as decisions about the care of their children. In the same context, we
could characterize privacy in the sense of both the parents' and the child's
isolation from outside scrutiny. For example, in some ways a parent's pri-
vacy is defined by decisions made in which outsiders have no right to inter-
vene, such as a decision to send a child to his room. Family privacy also
may mean that although a parent's chosen actions may be visible, as in the
case of spanking a child at the supermarket, no outsider has the right to
usurp that parental control. The values recognized in these characteriza-
tions of legitimate family autonomy include presumptions of desirable con-
sequences to parents, children, and society, as well as reverence for the
inviolate individual.1" Thus, all of the elements arguably constituting pri-
vacy are present in the family context.
Juxtaposed against the concepts of individual privacy and family auton-
omy is the notion of justifiable intervention into the workings of the family.
This paper specifically focuses on family intervention for the ostensible pur-
pose of advancing the welfare of children within the family. There are dif-
ferent types of intervention, and potentially different parties who may
implement them. The American system of family intervention is a combi-
8. INNESs, supra note 2, at 19. Inness identifies the first account as representative of tort law's
concept of privacy and the second account as representative of the constitutional law definition of
privacy. Because the state's right to interfere in a parent-child relationship is usually character-
ized as a constitutional issue, my working definition of privacy focuses on control.
9. Cf Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual Privacy. A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U.
FLA. L. Rnv. 627, 642 (1987) (Rutherford points out that there is not even agreement as to what
should be included within the right of privacy; assessing the value of privacy is difficult if we do
not know what it entails).
10. Such desirable consequences may include safety, encouragement of free discourse, and
promotion of interpersonal relationships. INNEss, supra note 2, at 18.
11. On a society-wide basis, this is related to a respect for diversity.
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nation of legal and societal interventions with periodic shifts in their domi-
nance. Legal intervention includes actions taken by police, lawyers, and
judges under the auspices of the criminal court system or the juvenile court
system. 2 The criminal system focuses on parental responsibility, accounta-
bility, and punishment, while the juvenile court system, at least in theory,
looks to protect the child in the best way possible.
Other agents of society may also intervene in families. Social workers,
mental health professionals, teachers, or other concerned citizens can act in
family crisis situations without necessarily invoking an official legal process.
This type of intervention is referred to as societal intervention.
B. Historical Developments
An understanding of the current approach to family autonomy requires
some examination of its evolution in the law and society of the United
States. Individual privacy and family autonomy have followed, and con-
tinue to follow, parallel lines of development. As one has increased, so too
has the other, largely because of changes within the structure of the Ameri-
can family itself. As expectations about the role of family have changed, so
have the relationships between husbands and wives, and parents and
children.
To examine why American law and policy have been so fiercely protec-
tive of privacy and autonomy within the family, this section will briefly
outline some of the significant changes families in the United States have
undergone since the mid-eighteenth century. The parallel development of
laws and policies governing intervention between parents and their children
will also be discussed. It will be argued that privacy has been treated as an
essential pre-condition for the family to fulfill its primary responsibilities to
society at large, and also for the development of autonomous individuals.
Family autonomy represented, at most times in American history, the
most efficient route to the family's fulfillment of its cultural functions. Ini-
tially, this was based upon the perception of family as the naturally effective
servant of an orderly society. This perception is indicative of a presumption
that parents can be trusted to act in the best interests of their children.
Eventually, family privacy was seen as a right of autonomous adult family
members, as well as a logical result of the family's retreat into the private
rather than the public world. This is related to a second presumption sup-
12. It could also occur within the family court system which uses "the best interests of the
child" as its guiding principle. However, family court interventions are typically undertaken only
when the court has ongoing jurisdiction over some related family matter, for example, a divorce.
Since this article is focused on interventions due to parental action or inaction, family court inter-
vention will not be specifically discussed.
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porting society's reverence for family autonomy: that privacy is good for
families and, in particular, enables families to carry out their role of produc-
ing well-adjusted, autonomous individuals.
1. The Colonial Family
The pre-colonial and colonial family was inextricably linked to society
at large. "Through much of the colonial period, most colonists conceived
of the family as part of a hierarchically organized, interdependent society
rather than as a separate and distinct sphere of experience. Households
were tightly bound to the rest of society by taut strings of reciprocity."
' 13
While common visions of an extended family residing in one household are
probably inaccurate,14 ties between family and community were a vital part
of colonial life. Female relatives and friends attended women during preg-
nancy and childbirth, and many household and agricultural tasks were per-
formed in cooperation with other members of the community.15
Just as the society at large was hierarchically organized, so too was the
colonial family, with the father as the top authority.16 In theory, the
mother had less authority over her children; however, in practice she had a
great deal of influence, especially over her daughters.17 Parental rights were
viewed as interrelated with the duty to support, properly educate, and en-
courage children to be good members of society.'" The responsibility to
produce good citizens was taken seriously not only by fathers, but by
mothers as well. As one woman wrote in 1755: "[E]ven we the weaker Sex
may be Serviceable to the Society where we live and to the world in general
by bringing up our Children in Such a manner as to abhor Vice and act
Virtuously from a principle early inculcated which is the most likely to be
lasting. '"19
Most mothers and fathers took their duty to shape their children into
productive members of society seriously, and prevailing wisdom dictated
that the family was the most natural and effective place for this shaping to
occur.20  However, society continued to guard its right to function
13. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 4 (1985).
14. See DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 46-55 (1972).
15. See generally MARY BETH NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS (1980) (cooperative tasks
included cheese-making, spinning, weaving, harvesting, and barn-raising).
16. Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Ma-
trix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REv. 293, 299-300 (1972).
17. NORTON, supra note 15, at 95.
18. Thomas, supra note 16, at 299-300.
19. NORTON, supra note 15, at 101 (quoting Abigail Paine Greenleaf).
20. "Church and school, though valued for their contributions, were subservient to the family
in turning unruly, immature children into dutiful subjects." CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN
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smoothly, untroubled by criminal or nonproductive members. Where fami-
lies failed, society stepped in:
The father (and on his death, the mother) is generally entitled to the
custody of the infant children, inasmuch as they are their natural
protectors, for maintenance and education. But the courts of justice
may, in their sound discretion, and when the morals, or safety, or
interests of the children strongly require it, withdraw the infants
from the custody of the father or mother, and place the care and
custody of them elsewhere....
Child protection efforts during this period appear to have been largely
motivated by society's perceived interest in protecting itself from neglected
or abused children. It was feared that these children would become paupers
or criminals who would become a burden on society and a threat to the
social order. Thus, the purpose of out-of-home placement was not to serve
the child's needs, but rather to deal with the child in a socially beneficial
manner. Some children were placed in poorhouses, where they were mixed
with various types of troubled adults.2" Most colonial children who were
removed from their parents' custody entered into apprenticeships, some-
times without parental consent.2 3 "While the colonists were concerned
about the welfare of dependent and orphaned children, the early records
show that the desire or necessity for economy overrode all other considera-
tions." 4 Even later efforts to protect children from unhealthy or excessive
labor, or from the perils of almshouses filled with criminal or mentally ill
adults, were advanced chiefly to benefit society as a whole.
Society's right to ensure a certain minimum level of social compliance
appears to have been taken for granted. The state had the power to substi-
tute itself in the parental role to protect society's own interests where (as
the Supreme Court stated years later) "harm to the physical or mental
health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been
demonstrated or may be properly inferred. 2
Despite claims of society's right to interfere in a family, it was rarely
asserted that a right to assess the appropriateness of parental punishments
existed. It is more accurate to view appropriate court intervention in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as neglect cases where the parents had
AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1600-1865, at 27 (Robert H. Bremner et al. eds., 1970)
[hereinafter CHILDREN AND YOUTH].
21. JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 203-05 (11th ed. 1867), reprinted
in CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 20, at 364.
22. Thomas, supra note 16, at 301.
23. Id.
24. CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 20, at 64-71.
25. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972).
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failed to provide appropriate discipline, education, or moral guidance. Ex-
treme family poverty, with the consequent failure to provide the necessities
of life for children, was also considered a legitimate ground for child re-
moval. Society rarely intervened because a child had been punished too
harshly. "The courts reasoned that an orderly society depended on parents
having discretion in disciplining within the home in order to maintain do-
mestic harmony and family government."26 Theoretically, only physical
punishment which caused severe and permanent injury to the child, or was
motivated by malice rather than disciplinary intent, could be prosecuted
successfully under criminal statutes. However, there is a paucity of these
types of reported cases as well.
Early American judicial decisions gave the benefit of the doubt to par-
ents in disciplinary and other family matters. These decisions stressed that
deference to parental authority was essential to preserving the social order
and producing productive and law abiding citizens." Apparently, it was
assumed that parents would automatically and naturally discern the best
interests of their children.
2. The Nineteenth-Century Family
Perhaps the most obvious social changes of the nineteenth century were
caused by the Industrial Revolution.28 Production moved to the private
sector, and the family became more autonomous and private as a conse-
quence. Adults and children flocked to the new factory jobs. Heretofore
unconsidered issues arose, particularly with respect to children, as society
evaluated working conditions, wages, total working hours, and the general
acceptability of child labor. Workers increasingly left home to pursue eco-
nomic interests, and personal qualities such as independence, ambition, and
autonomy became highly valued.
As social reforms began to protect children and other workers, the
American idealized image of the independent individual continued to de-
velop. Courts adjusted their reasoning to gradually create a rhetoric of
family autonomy and "parental rights" which could be limited only by sig-
nificant state interests. One legitimate state interest was the assurance of
some minimum level of welfare for the child. Increasingly, families resisted
community authority, opting instead for a more self-interested autonomy.
A series of interconnected changes marked the crucial transition of
the family from a public to a private institution. The economic
26. Thomas, supra note 16, at 304.
27. Id. at 305.
28. Most of the ideas in this section, especially the introduction, must be attributed to GRoss-
BERG, supra note 13.
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moorings of the household shifted from production toward con-
sumption. Generational influences on family formation declined.
New fertility patterns resulted in declining family size. A new do-
mestic egalitarianism emerged to challenge patriarchy. Other altera-
tions included companionate marital practices and contractual
notions of spousal relations, an elevation of childhood and mother-
hood to favored status within the home, an emphasis on domestic
intimacy as a counterweight to marketplace competition, and a more
clearly defined use of private property as the major source of domes-
tic autonomy.29
These complex social developments led to the rejection of patriarchal
authority and governmental activism. The home became increasingly iso-
lated from the rest of society. "Republican political ideology's reinforce-
ment of individual worth and personal identity, the evangelical emphasis on
equality before God, and the individual competitiveness and acquisitiveness
unleashed by market capitalism fueled demands for greater autonomy in all
relations, even domestic ones." 30
Social attitudes towards children and child-rearing also underwent
enormous changes. "During the nineteenth century, children came to be
seen more explicitly than ever as vulnerable, malleable charges with a spe-
cial innocence and with particular needs, talents, and characters. Conse-
quently, authoritarian child rearing and hierarchical relations succumbed to
greater permissiveness, intimacy, and character building. '3' However, the
social implications of proper child-rearing remained important. "Though
other institutions such as the common school and the church shared its
duties, molding the nation's young into virtuous republicans and competent
burghers became more clearly the primary responsibility of the family."'32
Although many of the changes in the family and its treatment by law
and society were due to different expectations and practices with respect to
marriage, the social and economic factors which affected the family had
specific effects on the parent-child relationship as well.
Although there has been much speculation about the implications of
the fact that the principal tie between most modern couples is emo-
tional rather than economic, it has been less remarked that the same
is true for the modern parent-child relationship. Children have
ceased to have the economic value they once had as helpers on the
farm, earners in industry or hedges against helpless old age. In a
purely economic sense they are liabilities rather than assets. That
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. at 7.
31. Id. at 8.
32. Id.
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people keep having them anyway despite the cost, is, in the view of
the Carnegie Council on Children, a "revolutionary" change. Phi-
lippe Aries, the celebrated and controversial historian of childhood,
sees the modem parent-child relationship, like the couple relation-
ship, as simultaneously intense and unstable to an historically un-
precedented degree.33
Thus, the many forces shaping American law and political structure in
general also shaped a distinctly American, and still evolving, law of the
family. In general, the judiciary encouraged individual responsibility for
policy-making. Law adopted the notion of co-existing public and private
spheres "which identified private will with the natural order and state ac-
tion as artificial intervention."3 4 Equally important in the development of
family law was the notion that this private sphere was inhabited by autono-
mous individuals. "The development of separate legal entities within the
republican family thus was [one of the] . . . major defining element[s] of
nineteenth century family law.",3
5
The family was simultaneously viewed as an autonomous, self-regulat-
ing world unto itself, and as a collection of independent and self-interested
individuals. The Anglo-American tradition had long relied on natural pa-
rental inclinations and affections as the basic safety mechanism protecting
family relations, with public surveillance providing some back-up in unu-
sual circumstances. Now, outside intervention was not only less frequent, it
was viewed as contrary to the proper separation of the public and private
spheres. There was an unacknowledged tension between treating the family
as completely autonomous and assuming that individual members of the
family would invariably have their needs met and their conflicts with each
other resolved without recourse to extra-family resources.3 6
Many historians and sociologists perceive great changes in the structure
and purpose of the family from early modem times to the present. Early
notions of marriage and family focused on the expectations of the larger
kinship groups as well as on the role of the family in raising productive
citizens for the commonwealth. The marital relationship was essentially a
bargained-for contract, with its most significant terms and expectations fre-
quently being economic provisions. By the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury, there was a greater expectation of individual emotional fulfillment
within marriage and family. This ideal of independent and self-interested
33. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 18.
34. GROSSBERG, supra note 13, at 14.
35. Id. at 24.
36. Id. at 26.
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individuals developing within families necessitated an autonomous family
that could adjust to the needs of its unique individuals.
Evolving areas of knowledge, such as psychology and child develop-
ment, supported the theory of autonomous families being necessary and
natural. Theories of child-rearing focused more on tolerance and recogni-
tion of the individual qualities of each child. "The parent was to use his
authority and knowledge to balance what seemed essential in his world
against what was novel and viable in the new world of the child. There
were no absolute answers; every child was a gamble."3 William J. Shearer,
a leading nineteenth-century authority on children, advised parents to
"make out of each [child] what the Almighty evidently intended him to be.
What He intended is not always an easy matter to determine. The only way
it can be determined is by carefully studying the peculiarities of each mind,
heart and body with which every child is gifted."3 Such emphasis on the
individual characteristics of each child, coupled with the increasing isola-
tion of the family, implies that the parents were in a unique position to
determine what was appropriate for each of their children, and those deci-
sions could not be questioned by external authority.
Interestingly, both the colonial family, with its community connections,
and the increasingly isolated nineteenth-century family were viewed as serv-
ing the essential purpose of developing good citizens who were prepared to
lead productive lives in the greater society. Perhaps what changed the most
was not the perceived purpose of the family, but the perceptions about how
that purpose could best be realized. Society was increasingly characterized
as a voluntary association of autonomous individuals, where the role of the
family was to nurture and protect happy, independent individuals who ulti-
mately would be fulfilled by their freely chosen alliance with the larger
society.
The patriarchal colonial society certainly protected parental authority,
but it did so in a context of stronger ties between each family and the larger
society. The more individualistic society of the nineteenth century also pro-
tected parental authority, but in the context of individual rights and deci-
sions, autonomous families, suspicion about any kind of state involvement,
and laissez-faire economic policies. Led by the parents, each family could
theoretically assess what actions would best advance the interests of its
unique individuals.
37. BERNARD WISHY, THE CHILD AND THE REPUBLIC 122-23 (1968).
38. Id. at 122 (quoting WILLIAM J. SHEARER, THE MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING OF CHIL-
DREN 269 (1898)).
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Courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had to re-
spond to four major social developments: (1) the increased separation of
family and public spheres of life; (2) the family as an entity whose main
purpose was to provide fulfillment and happiness for individuals within the
family; (3) the emergence of the idealized rugged individual who fashioned
his own life, followed his own conscience, and pursued his own interests;
and (4) the organization of child welfare efforts that recognized children as
individuals having some minimum level of "rights." If individuals were too
busy pursuing their own interests to intervene in the affairs of other fami-
lies, and prevailing wisdom precluded state intervention, parental decisions
would be challenged only if an important state interest was contravened.
Gradually, a body of judicial opinions developed which solidified these
presumptions about family autonomy, protection of parental authority, and
state intervention limited to protection of clearly defined and vital societal
interests.
3. The Twentieth-Century Family
The twentieth century brought with it the notion of companionate mar-
riage as well as the growing acceptance of the practice of divorce, and
greater economic dependence by family members on sources outside of the
family. This led to what has been called "the new family." Mary Ann
Glendon described it as follows:
The "new family" is a convenient way of referring to that group of
changes that characterizes 20th century Western marriage and fam-
ily behavior, such as increasing fluidity, detachability and inter-
changeability of family relationships; the increasing appearance, or
at least visibility, of family behavior outside formal legal categories;
and to changing attitudes and behavior patterns in authority struc-
ture and economic relations within the family. It follows from these
changes that the new family is no family in the sense of a single
model that can be called typical for modem industrialized societies.
The new family is a concept that represents a variety of co-existing
family types. 3
9
The social and economic changes within the "new family" combined with
social and economic changes in child maltreatment policy to produce a new
perspective on family intervention.
Judith Areen pointed out two significant developments that occurred
early in the twentieth century. The first was a series of changes in the poor
relief system which, by granting benefits, enabled the poor to keep and
39. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 3-4 (emphasis in original).
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support their children." The second was state acceptance of a protective
role in the emotional, as well as the physical, well-being of children.4"
The changes in the relief system made parental poverty a defense to,
rather than a basis for, a finding that a child was neglected.42 Although this
seemingly represented progress away from moralizing and towards helping
children, there was a lingering aura of disapproval associated with official
interventions into the parent-child relationship. "Still dominant was the
notion that much poverty stemmed from the immorality of the poor.
Mothers' pension programs would not, for instance, support children born
out of wedlock nor, in many cases, even the deserted family."43
Federal income supports for families with children were introduced by
the Social Security Act in 1935." These supports, which theoretically pre-
vent removal of poor children from their families for lack of adequate re-
sources, were awarded with traditional values in mind:
[B]ecause the grants-in-aid funding scheme allowed states considera-
ble discretion in establishing eligibility criteria, many children were
in fact denied aid to dependent children because their mothers failed
to meet the "suitable home" criteria established locally. In general,
mothers were declared ineligible for assistance if they were consid-
ered immoral, that is, if they were living with men they were not
married to or if they had out-of-wedlock children; housekeeping
standards could also be criticized and used as a criterion to disqual-
ify families from relief.
The public welfare system thus incorporated old mores and
discouraged many of the poorest families from applying for
assistance.
The second major change identified by Areen was the expansion of the
state's protective role towards children to include the possibility of interven-
tion in cases of emotional harm. "Often this change was accompanied by a
revision of statutes that made parental immorality a basis for state interven-
40. Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in
Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 911 (1975).
41. Id. at 910-11.
42. Id. at 911.
43. Marguerite Rosenthal & James A. Louis, The Law's Evolving Role in Child Abuse and
Neglect, reprinted in THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 58 (Leroy H. Pel-
ton ed., 1981).
44. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 301 (1988)). For examples of recent additions to the Social Security Act, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1988) (appropriations enabling states to help maintain and strengthen family life for needy
families); 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1988) (grants to states that provide aid to dependent children of unem-
ployed parents); 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1988) (insurance benefits for children).
45. Rosenthal & Louis, supra note 43, at 61-62.
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tion. In New York, for example, impairment of emotional health and im-
pairment of mental or emotional condition were made grounds for
intervention in 1970, while lack of moral supervision was eliminated."'
Theoretically, this was an enlargement of state protective powers on behalf
of children. However, it actually reduced the likelihood of state interven-
tion because externally visible parental behavior no longer justified child-
removal; proof of actual emotional or physical harm became necessary.
This acceptance of a legal and societal obligation to protect the emo-
tional health and development of children complicated the task of defining
the limits of individual privacy and family autonomy. In many cases, iden-
tification of significant emotional damage to a child requires closer scrutiny
of family operations than the more visible effects of physical cruelty and
poverty.
The factors discussed above contributed to the evolution of a different
and far more autonomous type of "new family."'4 This new family was
increasingly recognized in a growing body of jurisprudence that recognized
parental rights such as privacy and authority as essential instruments of an
orderly society, as well as individually held rights being balanced with the
"rights" of society. In effect, the courts recognized that both society and
parents had important and protectable interests in how children were
raised. Although the well-being of children was certainly a consideration,
the concept of "children's rights" did not develop until much later, and
arguably has not yet fully evolved.
II. THE COURTS: SACRIFICING CHILD PROTECTION TO FAMILY
AUTONOMY INTERESTS
One way to interpret American cases dealing with family autonomy is-
sues is to say that courts will, whenever possible, defer to parental authority
and preserve the privacy that has come to be expected by families. In a line
of cases which addressed the allocation of power between parents and the
state to direct children's upbringing, the Supreme Court defended parental
authority and allowed the state to supplant it only where an important and
clearly relevant governmental or societal interest was at stake.
In 1923, the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska4 reversed the convic-
tion of a parochial school teacher who taught German language materials
to an elementary school child in contravention of a Nebraska statute which
46. Areen, supra note 40, at 911.
47. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 3-4; see generally GROSSBERG, supra note 13, at 3-30 (concept
of "the republican family").
48. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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forbade the teaching of foreign languages to children until they had gradu-
ated from the eighth grade. The Court recognized the legitimate power of
the State to compel school attendance and to establish minimum curricular
requirements. However, the Court found no compelling state interest in
preventing foreign language instruction sufficient to overshadow the Four-
teenth Amendment rights of the teacher to teach and of parents to hire him
to teach German to their children.49 While the State is empowered to re-
quire education of children, the Court refused to extend this power to a
standardized program required in every instance, where the parents have
other compelling concerns.5
Similarly, in the 1925 case Pierce v. Society of Sisters,5' the Court struck
down an Oregon statute which required parents and guardians of children
between the ages of eight and sixteen to send those children to public
school. This statute effectively precluded parents from electing to send
their children to private schools. Although the Court again recognized the
State's legitimate power to regulate schools and to require school attend-
ance, it found that the Oregon law "unreasonably interfere[d] with the lib-
erty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control."52 The Court added:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to stand-
ardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.53
In 1944, the Court invoked the doctrine of parens patriae to uphold a
state child labor law under which a mother was convicted. Prince v. Massa-
chusetts54 involved a nine year-old girl who distributed religious tracts and
the consequent conviction of her mother for violation of State child labor
laws. The Court justified the State's override of this parental decision as
necessary to protect the child and to further the state interest in the child's
well-being. The Court reasoned that "a democratic society rests, for its
continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into
49. Id. at 400, 402.
50. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Meyer, 262 U.S. 390 (discussing antiforeign
language laws).
51. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
52. Id. at 534-35.
53. Id. at 535.
54. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-71 (1944).
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full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against
impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection."
55
The Court applied the Prince holding to the 1972 case Wisconsin v.
Yoder.56 The State argued, inter alia, that Amish children had a right to a
secondary education regardless of the wishes of their parents, and the State
had the power to enforce this right. The Court nonetheless refused to su-
persede the decision of Amish parents to remove their children from school
two years before they would complete the State's compulsory education
term. Despite the argument that it was not the best choice for the children
involved, the Court refused to override the parental choice, stating that:
To be sure, the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exer-
cise claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears
that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the
child, or have potential for significant social burdens. But in this
case, the Amish have introduced persuasive evidence undermining
the arguments the State has advanced to support its claim in terms
of the welfare of the child and society as a whole.57
The Court also refused to find that the Amish form of education for chil-
dren over the age of fourteen would handicap them later should they decide
eventually to leave the Amish community.5
8
In the preceding cases, the Supreme Court reasoned that parental au-
thority must be protected and usurped only in extreme cases. However,
this reasoning has been challenged in cases questioning specific implementa-
tions of parental authority over children. The state has frequently at-
tempted to override parental decisions concerning the administration of
health care to children. Although these cases are most likely brought in
state court, the decisions mirror the deference to parental choices found in
federal decisions.
In general, a parental decision against medical treatment of a child, even
when it is based on the parent's religious beliefs, will be overturned where
the child's life is in immediate danger.5 9 The Supreme Court also recog-
nized other compelling state interests that justify overriding parental deci-
sions. For instance, the state's interest in public health has long been held
to justify mandatory vaccinations of children, regardless of parental
objections.6
55. I at 168.
56. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
57. Id. at 233-34 (italics in original).
58. Id at 224-25.
59. See, eg., In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (Pa. 1972).
60. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37-38 (1905).
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Areas deemed acceptable for state intervention are narrowly delineated,
and any gray areas are left to the discretion of the parents. Although courts
sometimes intervene to supplant decisions, the opinions make it clear that
this is viewed as an unfortunate and limited incursion into the sacred realm
of family life. For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts,61 the Court upheld
the state statute protecting the child but the decision was accompanied by
the following language:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom in-
cludes preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder.... [but] neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood
are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in
youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the par-
ent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibit-
ing the child's labor and in many other ways.62
Similarly, in Society of Sisters, the Court emphasized that "rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State."1
63
Where parental behavior produces uncertain harm, or "mere" risk, the
benefit of the doubt may well be given to the parent whose judgment will
stand. For example, in In re Phillip B.,' California challenged the refusal
of parents to consent to cardiac surgery on their twelve year-old son who
also suffered from Down's Syndrome. The parents' decision was allowed to
stand as a reasonable conclusion after balancing the possible benefits against
the risks of the operation.65 Doctors had advised that failure to operate
would lead to a deterioration in Phillip's quality of life and could eventually
cause his death. He was not, however, in immediate danger of death if the
operation was not performed. 6
Four years later this result was changed by a decision that awarded
guardianship of Phillip to a couple who consented to the operation. Even in
such an unusual case, the court refused to characterize the parents' behav-
ior as neglectful or otherwise improper:
In reaching our decision .... we neither suggest nor imply that
appellants' subjectively motivated custodial objectives affront con-
ventional norms of parental fitness; rather, we determine only that
on the unusual factual record before us, the challenged order of
61. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
62. Id. at 166 (italics in original) (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted).
63. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 535.
64. 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
65. Id. at 50.
66. Id.
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guardianship must be upheld in order to avert potential harm to the
minor ward likely to result from appellants' continuing custody and
to subserve his best interests.6 7
This is just one example of the extreme deference the law accords to paren-
tal decisions, as well as the tendency of the law to assume that parents act
from good motives with respect to their children.
III. UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
Favoritism towards parental decisions and authority over children is
typically justified as preserving family autonomy and freedom from state
interference in private relationships. It is juxtaposed against a perception of
the state as Big Brother, dictating questionable morals to children who have
no respect for their elders, religion, or traditional values. Indeed, the re-
fusal of the state to second-guess parental action or inaction is characterized
as a policy of nonintervention. The law in its various manifestations does
not directly assert that some children are beyond its reach and will be sacri-
ficed to preserve privacy in family relations in this country. Rather, privacy
is represented as in the best interests of all children because certain assump-
tions are made about its overall effects.
There are at least two presumptions underlying the American philoso-
phy of family autonomy. The first presumption is that privacy strengthens
families. Because families are seen as the building blocks of society, privacy
must be good for families, for the children who live in families, and for
society. The second presumption is that parents can be trusted to identify
and to consistently act to advance the best interests of their children. How-
ever, these presumptions are at best questionable, especially in families
where child maltreatment occurs.
A. The Presumption That Privacy Strengthens Families
1. The Perceived Advantages of Family Autonomy
Dicta in cases concerned with family autonomy and parental rights usu-
ally focuses on what is characterized as the parental right to raise a child in
the way the parent feels is most appropriate.6 8 The language of the deci-
sions does not acknowledge the principle that stronger parents yield
stronger families. However, this reasoning is consistent with the fear that
state intervention will interfere with "the parent's claim to authority in her
own household and in the rearing of her children" which is "a sacred pri-
67. Guardianship of Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (Ct. App. 1983).
68. See, eg., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944).
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vate interest, basic in a democracy.",69 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the
Court refers to "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbring-
ing and education of children under their control."' 70 This reflects the pre-
viously discussed opinion of the Court in Prince v. Massachusetts.
71
As previously shown, parental authority was upheld to assure the pro-
duction of good citizens in the eighteenth century.72 With the subsequent
evolution of the autonomous individual and the new family, parental au-
thority was upheld as part of the privacy properly accorded to an individ-
ual within one's own home.73
A variety of values and good intentions have motivated increased socie-
tal protection of family autonomy. For instance, society has increasingly
valued individualism. Reinforcement of parental authority and respect for
unique parental choices assures that appropriately individualized treatment
can be devised by individual parents to meet the needs of each unique child.
Allowing parents to make unquestioned decisions about child-rearing also
enables parents to retain the traditions of their forefathers, while encourag-
ing a more culturally diverse society.
The preservation of family autonomy is partially motivated by the hope
of avoiding harms which could result from legal or societal intervention
into the family. Humanitarian impulses, as well as damaging results from
well-intentioned policies of family intervention,74 have gradually led policy-
makers to question whether intervention sometimes causes as much, if not
more, damage as allowing the status quo to continue in a maltreating
family.
The fear that infringement upon family privacy will damage the family
and impair the happiness and individual development of family members
may be the chief reason that family autonomy continues to be so revered.
Current experts have described child maltreatment as a complex dynamic
that reflects the interaction of many factors other than parental behaviors
and attitudes.71 If child maltreatment is a complex process requiring a mul-
tivariate analysis, it stands to reason that state intervention could destroy
69. Prince, 321 U.S. at 165.
70. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
71. See Prince, 321 U.S. 158 (Prince upheld convictions for child labor law violations on the
ground that even parental authority and family privacy did not preclude the state from interven-
ing to protect children from certain sorts of harms).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 13-27.
73. Parental authority was upheld where the individual lived in a conventional family.
74. These well-intentioned policies include orphanages, some versions of foster care where
stability was undermined, and the juvenile court system in general.
75. See, e.g., the works of James Garbarino and other advocates of the ecological approach to
child maltreatment.
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the delicate balance existing in a parent-child relationship. Destroying
these valuable parent-child bonds may further endanger a child's well-be-
ing. This argument is supported by the fact that even severely maltreated
children usually demonstrate some attachment to their parents and may be
traumatized by separation from their parents.
The attachment of children to parents who, by all ordinary stan-
dards, are very bad is a never-ceasing source of wonder to those who
seek to help them. Even when they are with kindly foster-parents
these children feel their roots to be in the homes where, perhaps,
they have been neglected and ill-treated, and keenly resent criticisms
directed against their parents. Efforts made to "save' a child from
his bad surroundings and to give him new standards are commonly
of no avail, since it is his own parents who, for good or ill, he values
and with whom he is identified.76
There is also concern that state intervention itself is stressful and trau-
matic, and may cause a fragile family to collapse where it might have func-
tioned in the absence of state interference.
In an influential series of works," Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit argued
that even in cases of child maltreatment, state intervention into families
should be the exception rather than the rule because of government's inabil-
ity to productively order interpersonal relationships. 78
[Law] neither has the sensitivity nor the resources to maintain or
supervise the ongoing day-to-day happenings between parent and
child-and these are essential to meeting ever-changing demands and
needs. Nor does it have the capacity to predict future events and
needs, which would justify or make workable over the long run any
specific conditions it might impose concerning, for example, educa-
tion, visitation, health care, or religious upbringing .... The law,
then, ought to and generally does prefer the private ordering of in-
terpersonal relationships over state intrusions on them.7 9
76. JOHN BOWLBY, CHILD CARE AND THE GROWTH OF LOVE 80 (2d ed. 1965).
77. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973)
[hereinafter GOLDSTEIN I]; JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
CHILD (1979) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN II]; JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD (1986) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN III].
78. It is difficult to say whether Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit increased the ferocious protec-
tion of family autonomy and parental authority or merely described it. However, these authors
have undoubtedly assumed the role of the nonintervention movement's "leading theoreticians."
See Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative,
75 GEO. L.J. 1745, 1762 (1987).
79. GOLDSTEIN I, supra note 77, at 50.
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Much of this impassioned argument for family autonomy8° rested on the
authors' insistence that such autonomy is essential to a child's healthy de-
velopment. They theorized that children would suffer severe psychological
harm from state intervention into the family partly because intervention
would destroy a child's belief that his parents were infallible."s Ultimately,
they argued that child placement decisions should be guided by an attempt
to provide "the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the
child's growth and development." 2 In the context of their theories, this
usually means minimal state intervention.
Although the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit theories have been influen-
tial, they have been criticized. As Marsha Garrison has pointed out, the
authors presented no concrete evidence for their claims.83 This failure to
support their conclusions may be due to a lack of specific supporting
evidence:
Experts have at times questioned the efficacy of intervention with a
noncooperative parent or the impact of intervention on a parent's
self-image, but no expert has suggested that intervention is harmful
because it damages a child's belief in his parents' omniscience.
Nor does common sense support Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's
view. Parents are not, in fact, omniscient or all-powerful, and evi-
dence of this reality is available daily from a variety of sources. It is
thus quite unlikely that intervention by child welfare authorities
would provide the first evidence of parental limitations. Addition-
ally, only very young children are likely to maintain such beliefs,
and the ability of these young children to comprehend that the au-
thorities pose a challenge to parental authority seems doubtful.
Given these facts, it is not surprising that studies of intervention
have only rarely reported negative effects.84
80. Actually, they use the term "'family integrity' rather than 'family autonomy' to encom-
pass the three liberty interests of direct concern to children (parental autonomy, the right to
autonomous parents, and privacy) .. " GOLDSTEIN II, supra note 77, at 9. However, this article
will continue to refer to privacy, family autonomy, and parental authority.
81. Id.
82. GOLDSTEIN I, supra note 77, at 53.
83. See generally Garrison, supra note 78 (critiquing the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit theories
in their first two works. The opening paragraph of her critique indicates its general thrust: "Rig-
orous analysis has not typically been employed by the drafters of standards implementing the least
drastic alternative. Indeed, the reform movement's leading theoreticians, Joseph Goldstein, Anna
Freud, and Albert Solnit, provide an excellent example of cavalier and over-optimistic analysis."
Id. at 1762.).
84. Id. at 1787 (citations omitted).
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2. Family Autonomy, Nonintervention, and Isolation
The positive value attributed to family privacy by the preceding theories
presumes that any contacts initiated by the public sphere into the private
will be potentially damaging. "Family autonomy" and "privacy," as used
here, imply a policy of state non-intervention. Yet, as pointed out by Fran-
ces Olsen, the concept of state nonintervention is meaningless in this con-
text. 5 By virtue of its existence as a source of norms and rules of law, the
state intervenes in individual families whether actively or passively. In
other words, state inaction affects the family just as significantly as state
action. A refusal to take specific action in a particular family conflict is
essentially the preservation of the status quo. "Nonintervention" in cases of
possible child maltreatment perpetuates unquestioned parental authority
and preserves the traditional balance of power between parents, who tradi-
tionally have power, and minor children, who traditionally lack power.
Thus, a decision against interference in a family is composed of numer-
ous policy decisions: what constitutes a family; what the distribution of
power should be in the family, because state nonaction reinforces existing
parental authority; and the assignment of tasks and roles within the fam-
ily.86 "Neither 'intervention' nor 'nonintervention' is an accurate descrip-
tion of any particular set of policies, and the terms obscure rather than
clarify the policy choices that society makes." 87
In addition to reinforcing traditional power structures and role assign-
ments, insulation from outside monitoring and support can be fairly charac-
terized as isolation. There is a fine line between autonomy, which implies
independence from outside meddling and destructive interference, and iso-
lation, which implies a lack of social supports and a lack of accountability
to community norms for behavior.88
Isolation from the community has been shown to have a negative im-
pact on families. One factor often identified in maltreating families is social
isolation and lack of community support. Steele and Pollock, pioneers in
the study of child maltreatment, concluded that, in general, "the abusing
parent tends to lead a life which is described as alienated, asocial, or iso-
85. Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 MICH. J.L. REF. 835
(1985).
86. Id at 837.
87. d
88. Of course, Olsen would likely claim that community norms are being observed; we just
are not admitting what those norms encompass.
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lated."89 The authors attribute this isolation to a lack of basic trust of other
people and a fear that the environment will not adequately respond to meet
the needs of the abusing parent. This attitude often stems from the parent's
own early caretakers who were not appropriately responsive to his or her
needs. After describing some of the manifestations of this lack of confi-
dence and resulting isolation, Steele and Pollock added: "We have jokingly
remarked that if one goes down the street and sees a house with the blinds
drawn in broad daylight, with two unrepaired cars in the driveway, and
finds the people have an unlisted phone number,9" the chances are high that
the inhabitants abuse their children." 91
Steele and Pollock's theories tend to focus on the "psychodynamic" ap-
proach and characterize child maltreatment as largely a function of paren-
tal personality development, or lack thereof. However, the "ecological"
perspective, another approach to the study of child maltreatment, also sup-
ports the theory that isolation and inadequate social supports are related to
child maltreatment. This approach studies child maltreatment from a more
global perspective and considers the interaction of personal attributes, such
as physical condition, age, personality, and family history, with environ-
mental conditions, such as poverty, societal attitudes, poor educational op-
portunities, substandard housing conditions, and unemployment.
James Garbarino, a leading proponent of the ecological approach, once
theorized that abuse results from the interaction between excessive privacy
and other conditions: social or economic stress; unstable patterns of parent-
ing; and some intrinsic characteristic of the child which makes him or her a
stimulus for the abusive parental behavior. 92 This last element is not meant
to "blame the victim," and is described by Garbarino as follows:
This may be due to something intrinsic to the child-such as an
overly active and nonresponsive temperament--or it may be due to
something extrinsic to the child-such as its resemblance to a hated
person, its ordinal position, or its relationship to someone resented
by the caregiver.93
89. Brandt F. Steele & Carl B. Pollock, A Psychiatric Study of Parents Who Abuse Infants and
Small Children, in THE BATTERED CHILD 103, 119 (Ray E. Heifer & C. Henry Kempe eds.,
1968).
90. "[A]busive parents were over seven times more likely to have unlisted phone numbers
than nonabusive parents." Edward Zigler & Nancy W. Hall, Physical Child Abuse in America:
Past, Present and Future, in CHILD MALTREATMENT 38, 61 (Dante Cicchetti & Vicki Carlson
eds., 1989) (citations omitted).
91. Steele & Pollock, supra note 89, at 120.
92. James Garbarino, The Price of Privacy in the Social Dynamics of Child Abuse, in CHILD
WELFARE 565, Nov. 1977.
93. Id. at 572.
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In a later book, Understanding Abusive Families,94 Garbarino and co-
author Gwen Gilliam described child maltreatment as partly a product of a
culture that tolerates and even encourages the use of force against children.
This society regards children as the rightful property of their parents, who
can treat their children in any manner they feel is appropriate. The authors
argued that an equally important condition necessary for child abuse "is
isolation of the parent-child relationship from potent prosocial support sys-
tems." 95 They explained that "[t]his factor pertains to the relation of the
family system or victim perpetrator dyad to the community."96
There are many studies that claim there is a connection between social
isolation and serious parenting problems.97 For example, adequate social
support often correlates to lower reports of depression by mothers.98 De-
pressed mothers frequently have parenting difficulties, which may stem
from the emotional withdrawal characteristic of depression.99
The quality of a parent's marital relationship plays a vital role in overall
psychological well-being and parental competence."° The adequacy of
other interpersonal relationships also affects parents' self-esteem and feel-
ings of competence, and therefore, at least, indirectly influences parental
competence. Lack of continuing extra-familial relationships as well as lack
of participation in cooperative neighborhood activities, such as child care,
have also have been shown to be correlates of abuse.101
In one analysis, Belsky and Vondra cite a number of studies supporting
the thesis that good parenting is associated with adequate social supports,
while child maltreatment is associated with parental social isolation.I°2 For
example, Powell found that mothers who had at least weekly contact with
friends exhibited more verbal and emotional responsivity towards their pre-
school children. 03 Similarly, Abernathy found that a parental sense of
competence in caretaking abilities, including an appreciation of the unique
94. GARBARINO & GILLIAM, supra note 1.
95. Id. at 33.
96. Id
97. See generally Jay Belsky & Joan Vondra, Lessons from Child Abuse: The Determinants of
Parenting, in CHILD MALTREATMENT 153, 172-87 (Dante Chicchetti & Vicki Carlson eds., 1989).
98. "[W]omen who reside in neighborhoods for an extended period, have really close friends,
and belong to voluntary associations are less likely than those without such social bonds to suffer
from depression." Id. at 172 (citation omitted).
99. See, eg., GARBARINO & GILLIAM, supra note 1, at 72-73.
100. Belsky & Vondra, supra note 97, at 174-78.
101. Garbarino, supra note 92, at 567.
102. Belsky & Vondra, supra note 97, at 172-87.
103. Id. at 178 (citing D.R. Powell, Personal Social Networks as a Focus for Primary Preven-
tion of Child Maltreatment, INFANT MENTAL HEALTH J. 232-39 (1980)).
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needs and abilities of each child, was positively associated with parental
participation in a tightly-knit social network.l04
It should be noted, however, that there can be too much of a good thing,
even with respect to social supports. Extreme amounts of social contact
may actually be detrimental to parenting functions.10 5 It appears not to be
social contacts per se that enhance parental functioning, but contacts that
improve the parents' own psychological well-being.10 6
At least one other argument holds that the reverence traditionally ac-
corded to family autonomy is neither in the best interests of families nor of
their individual members. If strict privacy is observed, family relations are
essentially exempt from observance of the social principles of justice and
moral treatment of individuals and there are no societal consequences if
these standards are not observed. As Susan Moller Okin points out in her
book Justice, Gender, and the Family, theories of justice that presume that
individuals will act with empathy and fairness towards one another ignore
the fact that the adult individuals capable of acting in this manner must
learn to do so in their families.107 Removal of families from reasonable
social contacts and supports could jeopardize their children's moral devel-
opment and prove detrimental to society at large.
B. The Presumption That Parents Can Be Counted Upon to Consistently
Act in the Best Interests of Their Children
Closely related to the presumption that privacy is best for children and
families is the presumption that parents will consistently act in the best
interests of their children. When considered together, the two presump-
tions represent the belief that if we simply leave families alone, parents will
work everything out for the best. These ideas are related to a long tradition
of parenting that is understood as instinctive in the sense that the proper
exercise of parental authority comes naturally. This belief that parenting
comes naturally is not only wrong, it endangers the welfare of children by
preventing necessary interventions.
The presumption that parents will usually act in the best interests of
their children is deeply ingrained, but not always acknowledged, in legal
writing and the philosophical theories that influence it. One unusually clear
104. Belsky & Vondra, supra note 97, at 179 (citing V.D. Abernathy, Social Network and
Response to the Maternal Role, 3 INT'L. J. Soc. FAM. 86, 86-92 (1973)).
105. Id. at 97, 179-80.
106. Id. at 180 (citing M. Cochran & J. Brassard, Child Development and Personal Social
Networks, in CHILD DEVELOPMENT 41 (1978); N.D. Colletta et al., The Impact of Support for
Adolescent Mothers (unpublished manuscript)).
107. SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY (1989).
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acknowledgement of this belief is found in Parham v. J.R.,' which ex-
amined due process requirements for the involuntary commitment of a
child to a mental institution by his parents:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More impor-
tant, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection
lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.10 9
The Court cited James Kent, whose Commentaries on American Law
stated: "The wants and weaknesses of children render it necessary that
some person maintain them, and the voice of nature has pointed out the
parent as the most fit and proper person. The laws and customs of all na-
tions have enforced this plain precept of universal law." 0 Kent also
opined that "[t]he obligation of parental duty is so well secured by the
strength of natural affection, that it seldom requires to be enforced by
human laws."'' Similarly, Blackstone noted that Providence had enforced
parental duties more effectively than could laws "by implanting in the
breast of every parent that natural ... or insuperable degree of affection,
which not even the wickedness, ingratitude, and rebellion of children, can
totally suppress or extinguish."11 2
In On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law,113 Samuel
Pufendorf attributed parental authority over children to two causes, the
tacit consent of the child and the caring for children which is imposed on
parents by natural law:
To prevent negligence, nature has implanted in parents a most
tender affection for [children]. Exercise of that care requires the
power ... to direct the children's actions for their own security,
which they do not yet discern for themselves since, they lack judge-
ment.... In practice parents' authority over children is established
when they acknowledge them, feed them and undertake to shape
them into good members of human society.' 4
108. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
109. Id. at 602 (citations omitted).
110. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 189-205 (1lth ed. 1867), reprinted
in CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 20, at 363.
111. Id.
112. William Blackstone, The Rights of Parent and Child, in 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 434, 435 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., 1983).
113. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATU-
RAL LAW (1991).
114. PUFENDORF, supra note 113, at 124.
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This same legal and philosophical tradition often treats evidence that
parents do not always act in the best interests of their children as an aberra-
tion which should not induce a change in social policy:
As with so many other legal presumptions, experience and reality
may rebut what the law accepts as a starting point; the incidence of
child neglect and abuse cases attests to this. That some parents
"may at times be acting against the interests of their child"... cre-
ates a basis for caution, but is hardly a reason to discard wholesale
those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally
do act in the child's best interests. The statist notion that govern-
mental power should supersede parental authority in all cases be-
cause some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to
American tradition.115
Thus, the belief that good parenting skills will naturally evolve if family
privacy is respected is deeply ingrained in our legal tradition.
The presumption that appropriate parenting occurs naturally and relia-
bly persists despite the fact that there is abundant evidence that this behav-
ior is not instinctual. Even if we accept the premise that parenting "comes
naturally," intervening factors such as adverse early life experiences or ex-
treme stress can inhibit or destroy appropriate parenting behaviors.
Early clinical studies of physically abusive parents drew attention to
the high proportion who had suffered severely deviant parenting in
their own upbringing.... There are a variety of problems in these
early studies. ... Nevertheless, better controlled studies have tended
to confirm the association between severe parenting problems and
the experience of serious childhood adversities."16
Although intervening factors affecting parenting ability are only par-
tially understood, they seem to interact in an extraordinarily complex way.
This is illustrated by the comments of one researcher:
[W]e found that the greater the overall burden of poor parenting
experienced, the greater the risk of poor parenting provided to the
next generation of children. It was striking, also, how one adversity
tended to lead to another. Thus, parental deviance probably consti-
tuted a genetic risk factor of some importance for some outcomes.
However, this (possibly) genetic factor also established an environ-
mental risk because the parental deficiencies tended to create a hos-
tile, discordant family environment leading to disrupted parenting
and then admission to an institution. The institutional rearing car-
115. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-03 (emphasis in original).
116. Michael Rutter, Intergenerational Continuities and Discontinuities in Serious Parenting
Difficulties, in CHILD MALTREATMENT 317, 323 (Dante Cicchetti & Vicki Carlson eds., 1989)
(citations omitted).
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ried its own risks, probably as a consequence of the lack of continu-
ous stable parenting (a risk that was possibly much intensified for
these children because of their genetic vulnerabilities and because of
their early experiences of disrupted parenting). 117
It is encouraging to note that, just as bad experiences jeopardize the
development of good parenting behaviors, positive, nurturing experiences
can encourage the development of good parenting, even in people who have
a history of damaging influences:
There is very little that is unalterable even with respect to the seque-
lae of severe and prolonged maltreatment in childhood. Good ex-
periences as late as early adult life can make an important difference
in outcome. However, it would be misleading to see such exper-
iences as a matter of chance or good luck. In part, later experiences
arise as a result of earlier circumstances, but also individuals can do
much to shape their lives, and it is the possibility of this positive
action to break cycles of transmitted deprivation that provides the
opportunity for preventive and therapeutic interventions." 8
Current adverse conditions also affect parenting behaviors. Studies
show that extreme stress, whether physical, emotional, economic, or cul-
tural, on a parent can make him or her operate in a basic survival mode. If
there is only a limited amount of energy, it may be used simply for survival
and the parent may not have the emotional resources left to meet the needs
of the children. "[I]n most such [neglecting] parents the psychic energy
ordinarily available for investment in child caring has been dissipated. The
instinct to parent has become distorted in its aim or overwhelmed by
problems of personal survival as a result of massive early deprivations.""' 9
Moreover, the combination of deficient early experiences and currently
overwhelming circumstances can further jeopardize the development of
positive parenting behaviors. The effects of early deprivation, whether ma-
terial or emotional, will in turn make parents more vulnerable to current
deprivations. "Socially impoverished families may be particularly vulnera-
ble to socially impoverished environments and susceptible to amelioration
only in socially rich environments."' I20 Good parenting appears to be a
product of many factors, such as individual temperament, learned behavior,
117. Id. at 339.
118. Id. at 344.
119. NORMAN A. POLANSKY ET AL., DAMAGED PARENTS: AN ANATOMY OF CHILD NE-
GLECT 147 (1981).
120. Id. at 26 (citation omitted).
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and quality of the current environment. There is nothing automatic about
it. 12
1
These conclusions are supported by statistics on child maltreatment in
this country, as well as anecdotal reports from the disciplines of social
work, law, medicine, and psychology, which demonstrate that a significant
number of parents and parent substitutes maltreat children each year. 122 It
is apparent that although parents may be in the best position to assess and
act to further their children's best interests, there are no guarantees they
will actually do either. As a result, it may be overstating the case to claim
that parents act in the best interests of their children. Parents may act in
what they perceive to be the best interests of their children. However, de-
pending on their knowledge, experience, social supports, and environment,
parents may not be able to accurately assess the best interests of their
children.
Finally, it should be noted that in certain circumstances, parents and
children may even have recognizable conflicts of interest. This may seem
like an odd idea, but the law already recognizes and attempts to balance
these types of conflicts. For example, it may be in the best interests of the
parents to have the children quit school and generate income for the sup-
port of the family. However, mandatory school attendance laws and re-
strictions on child labor prevent this behavior.
IV. THE PROPER ROLE OF LAW: PROVIDING STRUCTURES TO MEET
CHILDREN'S NEEDS
While newspapers focus on the dramatic cases of child abuse, we are
surrounded on a day-to-day basis with the more mundane incidents
of violence against children. An infant is dropped repeatedly. A
toddler is whipped. A 3-year-old is bruised. A kindergartner is
punched. A teenager is regularly assaulted by a parent for minor
misbehavior. These events rarely, if ever, reach the newspapers but
they are at the core of the problem .... [C]hildren are treated as if
they were the exclusive domain of parents, not future citizens, not
part of the larger society. How do we as a society allow child abuse?
121. Feminist scholarship has been especially critical of assumptions that parenting comes
naturally. Such claims set up parents (particularly mothers) for failure, since they assume a natu-
ral aptitude for the superhuman task which parenting has become due to increased modem expec-
tations. These unrealistic standards also increase the stigma associated with seeking help for
parenting difficulties. Cf SYLVIA A. HEWLETr, A LESSER LIFE (1986).
122. It is impossible to tell whether incidents of maltreatment or only the reports are increas-
ing, but there is no doubt that the phenomenon of child maltreatment is significantly present in
this society.
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We allow it by permitting value on privacy to be misused as a justifi-
cation for social isolation. 123
Although it is easier to point out problems than to propose solutions,
many approaches to the problem of child maltreatment have been sug-
gested. However, it sometimes seems that maltreated children, like the
poor, shall always be with us.
Currently, much of the law's response to child maltreatment is not to
prevent or identify risks, ostensibly out of deference to family autonomy
and cultural diversity. Rather, the law chooses to roar in, remove the chil-
dren, and attempt to completely run family affairs when maltreatment has
been "identified." This all-or-nothing approach leaves too much to chance
and increases the stigma attached to those needing help.
Family autonomy and individual privacy are definitely valuable in this
society. Nonetheless, their protection should not mean that children must
be stuck with the luck of the draw in having their needs fulfilled. Nor
should the fact that we do not know everything about child development
and children's needs prevent us as a society from requiring that all children
have access to certain developmentally positive resources. There is a real
possibility that outside supports could counteract many of the harmful in-
fluences of deficiencies within the family.
Specifically, many social reforms could be implemented to make re-
sources more readily available to families that need them without the at-
tached stigma. Classes in parenting and child development could be
required in middle schools or even elementary schools. Quality day care
choices available at reasonable cost could reduce the stresses associated
with overworked, overburdened parents who must scramble to find even
low-quality child care. Crisis nurseries, for infants and older children,
would give parents a safety valve when things begin to get out of control.
Parent support groups could provide useful information and needed social
contacts. Reasonably priced and available mental health and counseling
services would enable people to seek help before things become intolerable.
Smaller class sizes would give all teachers greater opportunity to meet the
individual needs of their students. Addressing issues of poverty and unem-
ployment could reduce some of the major stresses which have been tied to
child maltreatment. In fact, many of these programs and other family-en-
abling interventions have been implemented in some communities, and have
shown promising results.12 4
123. Garbarino, supra note 92, at 572.
124. See generally LISBETH B. SCHORR, WITHIN OUR REACH: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF
DISADVANTAGE (1988).
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Evidence that parenting is not instinctual and that isolation exacerbates
problems in the parent-child relationship may not seem sufficient to support
an argument for some sort of official legal or societal intervention. To
some, this suggestion may seem tantamount to a totalitarian society. The
kinds of intervention suggested, however, call for social support and in-
volvement rather than intrusion. Not every contact from outside the family
is a violation of privacy.
Families have always relied on some outside sources of support, such as
the church or kinship bonds. Social and economic forces, some of which
have been discussed in this article, have rendered families less capable of
meeting the needs of all their members. At the same time, ties to traditional
sources of support have become more attenuated. Often by default, the wel-
fare state has stepped in to fill the gap.125 Other structured organizations
could step in as well.
Some have claimed that offering individualized and voluntary social ser-
vice assistance to maltreating families is the only feasible solution. Cer-
tainly, voluntary assistance is an essential part of any policy designed to
reduce child maltreatment and strengthen families. However, the exclusive
focus on voluntary assistance does not acknowledge two important factors.
First, a hallmark of many dysfunctional families is the denial of the need for
help. Second, in many actual situations it is difficult to distinguish between
help which is accepted voluntarily and help which is coercively imposed.
Some parents "voluntarily" accept help because of the threat of what will
happen to them if they do not. A better legal alternative may be to require
family and community support programs such as mandatory education, or
guaranteed financial and social supports to parents and their minor
children.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have tried to show that much of the law's reverence for
parental privacy and family autonomy is based on false premises. We need
to scrutinize these and other long-held social beliefs about what is proper in
a family, and stop using unexamined platitudes as rationalizations for ig-
noring the developmental needs of children. We have hidden behind the
excuse of family autonomy for too long. True autonomy requires strength,
and strong families need to be supported by law. While championing pri-
vacy and autonomy, we have, in reality, imposed and reinforced social iso-
lation. The law must attempt to reverse this trend.
125. See generally GLENDON, supra note 1.
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